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The Hubble Servicing Mission Controversy: Is the Risk
of a Manned Mission Reasonable?
Paul G. Pastorek*
The National Academy of Sciences Committee recommended that NASA
abandon a robotic mission to repair the Hubble Space Telescope and fly a
manned mission to repair it instead. Is their assessment to recommend a
manned mission sound? Does it meet the criteria of the Columbia Accident
Investigation Board?
I. OVERVIEW

In January of 2004, Sean O'Keefe, the Administrator of the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration ("NASA"), announced a decision tol
Telescope (SM-4).
cancel the manned servicing mission to the Hubble Space
He believed that compliance with the safety recommendations of the Columbia

Accident Investigation Board issued months earlier could not be achieved in
time to fly a manned shuttle mission to replace the Hubble's batteries and
gyroscopes before their anticipated failure.

Mr. Pastorek is a partner in the law firm of Adams and Reese, LLP in New Orleans, LA and an
aerospace consultant. He is formerly General Counsel to the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, serving by appointment of President George W. Bush from February 2002 until
June 2004.
SM-4 stands for "Servicing Mission Number 4" and was intended to replace aging spacecraft
batteries, fine-guidance sensors, and gyroscopes, and to install two new science instruments on
the telescope. See National Research Council of the National Academies, Committee on the
Assessment of Options for Extending the Life of the Hubble Space Telescope ("NASC"),
Assessment of Optionsfor Extending the Life ofthe Hubble Space Telescope: FinalReport 8 (Nad Academies
2005), available online at <http://books.nap.edu/openbook/0309095301/html/index.htrnl>
(visited Mar 25, 2005). It was the fifth time that a space shuttle would be sent to visit the Hubble.
The first visit fixed Hubble's defective ground mirror, which left it myopic, by installing a contact
lens of sorts to correct its "sight." That successful mission resulted in turning what was widely
ridiculed as "space junk" into the incredibly successful telescope that it is today. Richard Stenger,
Who Should Explore Space, Man or Machine?, CNN.com (Feb 18, 2003), available online at
(visited
<http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/space/02/18/sprj.colu.space.future/index.htmil>
Mar 14, 2005).
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A public outcry immediately followed. The NASA Administrator was
vilified and accused of "killing" the inanimate Hubble Space Telescope. The
media, politicians, scientists, and public alike were infuriated as they had become
hooked on the remarkable and unique images produced by the telescope during
its storied history over the preceding thirteen years. The rationale for NASA's
decision to cancel the mission was largely ignored and became engulfed by the
hue and cry as the outrage persisted. The outspoken critics were shrill in arguing
that the decision on the telescope, a national treasure, was too important to be
left to the Administrator at NASA. They even went so far as to conclude that
the Administrator's decision to cancel the manned servicing mission
demonstrated his unwillingness to take risks.2
In an effort to quell the rage, NASA responded by proposing to repair the
Hubble by employing a "robotic" servicing mission. It undertook full-bore an
effort to assess the prospects, scope, cost, and timing of such an undertaking.
However, the measure was seen by some as unrealistic and pressure mounted
for an independent opinion. NASA finally acquiesced to requests from Congress
and elsewhere for an outside study and invited the National Academy of
Sciences to review and recommend one of the two options to "save" the
Hubble: a manned Shuttle mission or a robotic one.
In the late spring of 2004, the National Academy of Sciences appointed the
Committee on the Assessment of Options for Extending the Life of the Hubble
Space Telescope3 (the "National Academy of Sciences Committee," or
"NASC"). It issued a final report on December 8, 2004, in which it unanimously
concluded that:
. . .NASA should commit to a servicing mission to the Hubble Space
Telescope that accomplishes the objectives of the originally planned SM-4 4
mission.
2

See, for example, Death Sentence for the Hubble?, NY Times A14 (Feb 13, 2005); Guy Gugliotta,
Hubble Decision a Blow to GoddardEngneers; No Chance to Show Feasibility of Robot Mission, Wash Post
A03 (Feb 9, 2005); Alcestis Oberg, Fade to Black, USA Today 11A (Feb 16, 2005); Graham
Warwick, Exploration Accelerates Aeronautics' Decline, Flight Ind 21 (Feb 15, 2005). For Mr.
O'Keefe's response to these criticisms, see Editorial, Re 'Death Sentence for the Hubble?", NY Times
A14 (Feb 19, 2005).

3

Warren E. Leary, NASA Agrees to New Study on New Mission to Telescope, NY Times A12
(Mar 12, 2004).

4

In 2004, NASA had undertaken to study and plan for a robotic servicing mission which would do
what was technologically feasible and cost responsible and which might not include all of the
requirements originally planned for SM-4. NASA recognized that the more complex and
numerous the mission requirements (particularly the installation of the two new instruments), the
more costly and risky it would be to complete the mission. Thus, the NASC recommends that the
scientific community receive what it had expected: the benefit of the full array of SM-4 mission
objectives. The mission is simply too important. See NASC, Assessment of Optionsfor Extending the
Life of the Hubble Space Telescope at 72 (cited in note 1);see also, Gugliotta, Hubble Decision a Blow to
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The committee recommends that NASA pursue a [manned] shuttle
servicing mission to . . . [the Hubble Space Telescope] that would
accomplish the above stated goal. Strong consideration should be given to
flying this mission as early as possible after return to flight.
A robotic mission approach should be pursued solely to de-orbit Hubble
after the period of extended science operations enabled by a shuttle
for the appropriate
astronaut servicing mission, thus allowing time
5
development of the necessary robotic technology.

As the former General Counsel for NASA who counseled the agency
during the Columbia disaster and the subsequent investigation of the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board and who participated in the decision to cancel the
servicing mission, I am distressed by the recommendations of the National
Academy of Sciences Committee. This is not because of disagreement, but
because the recommendations appear to be based on an optimistic view of the
risks attendant to a Hubble SM-4 mission and because they fail to adequately
address the whole risk spectrum of such a mission.
Having lived through the tragedy of Columbia, there was the danger that
NASA would become risk averse. The Columbia experience did not, however,
have this effect. Instead, NASA and its Administrator merely became more risk
conscious. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report ("CAIB Report")
demands greater risk consciousness. The legacy of seven Columbia astronauts,
seven Challenger astronauts, and three Apollo astronauts demands greater risk
consciousness. And so the Administrator, in assessing risks of a Shuttle servicing
mission to the Hubble Space Telescope, views the "best case" and the "worst
case." If, after reviewing all of the risk from all vantages in a principled way, the
decisionmaker cannot accept the extent of the risk, a decision to cancel a
mission is not necessarily risk averse. Indeed, it is more likely risk conscious.
II. THE DECISION TO CANCEL THE SHUTTLE SERVICING
MISSION TO THE HUBBLE SPACE TELESCOPE

A. THE BUDGET PROCESS
During every annual budget cycle, NASA must evaluate each existing and
proposed program and decide which to pursue in the upcoming fiscal year. In
doing so, it must decide based on the best information available at the time. In
the winter of 2003, NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe was in the final stage of
making decisions about the upcoming budget for FY'04 (fiscal year October 1,
2004 through September 30, 2005). He faced a very difficult decision regarding
Goddard Engineers, Wash Post at A03 (cited in note 2) (suggesting both that a robotic mission
would be too costly and that it would take too long to assemble the necessary machinery).
5

NASC, Assessment of OptionsforExtending the Life ofthe Hubble Space Telescope at 106 (cited in note 1).
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the Hubble Space Telescope. He contemplated whether NASA should proceed
with the then planned shuttle servicing mission to replace aging batteries,
guidance sensors, and gyroscopes to keep the telescope operational.
O'Keefe knew that in the pantheon of great tragedies and triumphs of
NASA, Hubble was both a tragedy and a triumph. After being deployed by
Space Shuttle Discovery on April 25, 1990, the telescope's mirror was determined
to be defective and the telescope was ridiculed as "a billion dollars worth of
space junk." However, NASA was undaunted and mounted an unprecedented
shuttle repair mission that many thought too improbable to succeed (just as the
NASC opined about the robotic servicing mission above). The mission
proceeded in December of 1993, and astronauts successfully installed a
corrective lens on the telescope, which turned a "space junk" tragedy into a
triumph. A decision to terminate the planned Shuttle servicing mission would
not only be a blow to the nation and to NASA, but also to the robust scientific
community's reliance on the Hubble Space Telescope for its discoveries-which
have changed our understanding of the universe. Certainly, such a decision could
not be made lightly, and O'Keefe would not do so in this case.
But O'Keefe was also leading an agency that only ten months earlier had
experienced a tragedy of epic proportions-the loss of the shuttle orbiter
Columbia and its crew of seven.
B. THE TRAGEDY OVER TEXAS
On a clear, cool morning of February 1, 2003, several hundred people,
including NASA employees, families of crew members, and guests waited near
NASA's Shuttle Landing Facility at Kennedy Space Center to hear Space Shuttle
Columbia's characteristic double sonic boom (announcing its imminent
appearance in the sky). They expected another flawless touchdown on mother
Earth after a very successful science research mission performed in zero gravity
by seven exceptional human beings. Expectations of another safe arrival were
soon to be dashed.
In special bleachers away from the rest of the onlookers the family of the
crew of Space Transportation System ("STS") 107,6 waited for their loved ones
aboard the Columbia. As was customary for the last several years, the family and
their immediate friends were separated from the main crowd and media to avoid
the type of media stare that had gruesomely intruded on the families of the STS

6

Although the flight was originally scheduled to fly as the 107th mission of the Space Shuttle, it
was delayed for various reasons. Thus, this was actually the 113th flight of the Space Shuttle and
the 25th flight of the orbiter Columbia.
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51L crew in their moment of anguish and grief when the Shuttle Challenger
exploded on liftoff in 1986.
NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe chatted amiably with NASA
personnel. He had just completed his first year as the head of the world's
premier space agency. At the same time, Columbia was streaking across the
western coast of the United States near Sacramento, headed on a flight path that
would take it over Dallas-Fort Worth and then past Orlando over the Atlantic
Ocean, where it would turn and approach final touchdown at the Cape. But, as it
streaked across the western United States, unknown to but a few amateur
ground observers who filmed Columbia in the darkness of an early morning sky,
the leading edge of the shuttle's left wing was coming apart-first tile by tileand then a catastrophic loss of the left wing immediately followed by breakup of
the vehicle. At that moment, flight controllers, not knowing that the breakup
had occurred, lost all contact with the crew and began several radio
communications ("comm") checks to Commander Rick Husband to respond.
About thirty minutes later, the world and NASA's senior leaders were
horrified to witness the tragic footage on CNN of the breakup of the vehicle as
filmed by a Texas television station. Everyone's worst fears were realized.
Commander Rick D. Husband, pilot Willie C. McCool, Michael P. Anderson,
David M. Brown, Laurel Blair Salton Clark, Kalpana Chawla, and Israeli
astronaut Ilan Ramon were gone-their spouses, children, parents, friends, and
colleagues were left devastated. Columbia, the oldest shuttle in the fleet and the
first one to fly (in 1981) was also gone.
Within an hour, the NASA Administrator selected Admiral Harold
Gehman 7 to chair the board that would investigate the loss. The board was fully
constituted and staffed by day's end and it was on site in Texas and Louisiana
the following day.
America's space exploration program has been marked by both great
triumph and great tragedy, the difference between the two being remarkably
small. And so it was again that great tragedy would be imposed on this incredible
space agency, whether it was ready or not. NASA began a difficult journey to
recover from the tragedy that, in less than a year, would prompt a triumph when
the President would announce a new vision for civil space leading the nation on
a path for humans to explore the moon, Mars, and beyond.

7

He enjoyed a very distinguished career and completed more than thirty-five years of active duty in
October 2000. His last assignment was as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, and as
the Commander in Chief of the US Joint Forces Command, one of the five US Unified
Commands. Immediately after retiring, Gehman served as co-chairman of the Department of
Defense review of the terrorist attack on the USS Cole.
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C. COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD REPORT

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board ("CAIB") began its
independent investigation within hours of the accident, and it worked
exhaustively for nearly seven months. Its 13 members and a staff of more than
120 were supported full time by over 400 NASA engineers and scientists. More
than two hundred formal interviews were conducted, thirty thousand pages of
documentation were evaluated, and formal hearings were conducted in which
dozens of expert witnesses were examined. More than three thousand comments
were received from the community at large. The investigation's depth and
breadth were unprecedented in NASA's history.
On the eve of the issuance of the CAIB's report, in anticipation of these
findings, NASA senior leadership convened to contemplate its response to the
media. The report had not been pre-released to NASA, so contemplating how to
respond was difficult at best. But a response would be required, for a nonresponse or a delayed response would likely be attributed by the media to
NASA's lack of interest, understanding, or concern for the findings.
But, NASA did have an idea about how the report would look and how it
would be constructed because the CAIB had issued two interim reports which
contained findings and recommendations on particular subject matters and
because NASA had been providing a great deal of research and analysis for the
CAIB investigators to use in their assessment.
The straw man proposal on how to respond to the CAIB Report was put
forth to NASA leadership, namely that NASA would accept the findings of the
report and comply with its recommendations. A vigorous discussion ensued.
How can we accept what we have not studied thoroughly? How can we comply
with the possibility that there may be recommendations that require us to forego
contemplated shuttle missions that we believe are important?
For example, some in the NASA leadership were deeply concerned that
there might be a recommendation regarding debris shedding that would be so
hard to comply with as to be effectively impossible. If the recommendation was
impossible to achieve, then the space shuttle might never fly again. Thus,
compliance could be disastrous for the future of manned spaceflight. Some even
worried that the CAIB could be wrong in reaching its findings or making its
recommendations. Agreeing to comply before we saw the report would be
reckless. But to take this position rejected the whole notion of the need for an
independent investigation, which the Administrator had insisted upon all along.
In the end, we agreed to conduct an independent investigation and to abide by
its consequences, for to do otherwise would be to ignore clear warning of
danger and to unreasonably risk another catastrophic loss. NASA could not
equivocate and ignore a clear warning of the independent review panel in the
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unforgiving arena of space. The tragedy of losing a crew and a ship in the face of
clear warning was unacceptable.
At the time NASA was considering its response to the CAIB Report, it did
not focus on the possibility that the effect of the report would be to jeopardize
the Hubble SM-4 mission. But if it wanted to be consistent, NASA would have
to comply with the report whether it jeopardized the continued flight of the
Shuttle at all or the Hubble SM-4 mission itself.
It was agreed then: when the report was released, NASA's response would
be to accept the CAIB's findings, comply with its recommendations, and accept
the consequences that NASA's old way of doing business and any missions
already planned would be affected by its agreement to comply.
On August 26, 2003, the CAIB issued a 227-page report appended with
several volumes of studies and analyses. The report contained findings, as well as
twenty-nine recommendations. It also included non-binding observations, which
it offered for NASA's consideration.
In the end, the CAIB concluded that the cause was both physical and
organizational.
The physical cause of the [accident] . . .was a breach in the Thermal

Protection System on the leading edge of the left wing [of the Orbiter],
caused by a piece of insulating foam which separated from the left bipod
ramp section of the External Tank at 81.7 seconds after launch, and struck
the wing in the vicinity of the lower half of Reinforced Carbon-Carbon
panel number 8. During re-entry this breach in the Thermal Protection
System allowed superheated air to penetrate through the leading edge

insulation and progressively melt the aluminum structure of 8the left wing,
resulting in ... failure of the wing, and breakup of the Orbiter.
Just as important as the physical cause, the CAIB also determined that
organizational failure contributed to the accident:
...rooted in the Space Shuttle Program's history and culture, including the

original compromises that were required to gain approval for the Shuttle,
subsequent years of resource constraints, fluctuating priorities, schedule
pressures, mischaracterization of the Shuttle as operational rather than
developmental, and lack of an agreed national vision for human space flight.
Cultural traits and organizational practices detrimental to safety were
allowed to develop, including: reliance on past success as a substitute for
sound engineering practices (such as testing to understand why systems

were not performing in accordance with requirements); organizational
barriers that prevented effective communication of critical safety
information and stifled professional differences of opinion; lack of
integrated management across program elements; and the evolution of an

8

Columbia Accident Investigation Board ("CAIB', Report (vol 1) at 9 (Aug 2003), available online
at <http://www.caib.us/news/report/volumel/default.html> (visited Feb 13, 2005).
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informal clhain of command and
decision-making processes that operated
9
outside the organization's rules.
The CAIB concluded the report by noting that "[t]hese recommendations
reflect both the Board's strong support for return to flight at the earliest date
consistent with the overriding objective of safety, and the Board's conviction
that operation of the Space Shuttle, and all human spaceflight, is a
developmental activity with high inherent risks."'
Although the Board determined that the present shuttle is "not inherently
unsafe"," it came to an "inescapable' 2 conclusion:
13
Because of the risks inherent in the original design of the Space Shuttle,
because that design was based in many aspects on now-obsolete
technologies, and because the Shuttle is now an aging system but still
developmental in character, it is in the nation's interest to replace the
Shuttle as soon as possible as the primary means for transporting humans to

14
and from Earth orbit.
After the CAIB press conference, as expected, the media clamored for a
response from NASA. The Administrator stated firmly that NASA would not
shy away from the report even though it was very critical of the organization he
led. Indeed, he declared that he and NASA would embrace the report: the good,
the bad, and the ugly. It was difficult to accept responsibility for the catastrophe
that had occurred only one year after he took the helm and was based on causes
that, according to the CAIB, were largely years in the making. But he accepted
full responsibility for the loss of the crew and their ship. In addition to taking
responsibility, he assured the American people that NASA would accept the
CAIB's findings and comply with its recommendations, come what may.
He -vowed that NASA would return the shuttle to flight, safely and in
compliance with all of the recommendations of the CAIB. There were, however,

9
10
1

Id.
Id.

12

Id at 208.
Id at 210.

13

The 1990 Augustine Commission, convened to develop a vision for civil space, accurately
foretold of the likelihood of a tragedy that was to happen fourteen years later.
And although it is a subject that meets with reluctance to open discussion, and
has therefore too often been relegated to silence, the statistical evidence
indicates that we are likely to lose another Space Shuttle in the next several
years . . . probably before the planned Space Station is completely established
in orbit.

14

NASA, Report of the Adisoy Committee on the Future of the US Space Program, Executive Summary
(Dec
17,
1990),
available
online at <http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/pao/History/
augustine/racfup2.htm> (visited Feb 17, 2005).
CAIB, Report at 210-11 (cited in note 8).
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several engineering challenges to doing so. The shedding of the External Tank
insulating foam had to be corrected and the Thermal Protection System had to
be strengthened." The External Tank insulating foam had, in the past, regularly
shed on takeoff, causing damage to the underside of the Orbiter where delicate
heat tiles were located. This damage had previously been treated as a
maintenance item. However, because of the possibility for significant debris
shedding, as in the case of Columbia, and with new knowledge of the relatively
small amount of debris that -could caust seiriotis damage to the Thermal
Protection System, significant debris reduction had to be achieved.
Furthermore, NASA had to develop "in space" inspection and emergency
repair procedures to handle "the widest possible range of damage to the
Thermal Protection System" for both an International Space Station ("ISS")
mission and non-ISS mission (for example, the Hubble Space Telescope
servicing mission). 6
These recommendations in the fall of 2003, treated by NASA as
unalterable requirements, proved to be vexing even to the brilliant minds at
NASA. While there was an air of optimism and confidence that the
requirements could be implemented, the question was how long it would take
and how complex a solution would be required. Prior to the CAIB Report,
NASA planned to return to flight before the first anniversary of the tragedy. But
that plan evaporated rapidly once NASA realized how stringent the CAIB
to comply with the
recommendations were. Having committed
recommendations, a return to flight schedule was reworked to project a summer
2004 timeframe. Significant management attention turned to trying to meet the
schedule, but technical considerations overrode the desire to return to flight
quickly. In fact, the technological challenges by the fall of 2003 forced a delay to
a fall 2004 timeframe and even that was quite uncertain. The timeframe was later
pushed back to spring of 2005. Finally, in the fall of 2004, NASA became fairly
"confident," but still by no means certain, that it could meet the now scheduled
launch date of May-June 2005.7
Thus, it was in this context that the Administrator and NASA, over the
next several months, would reassess the shuttle's return to flight and what
missions it would undertake. There were two types of missions planned before

15

Id at 55, Recommendation 3.2-1.

16

Id at 174, Recommendation 6.4-1.

17

Indeed, on February 18, 2005, more than two years after the Columbia accident, NASA
announced a nineteen day launch date window beginning on May 15, 2005. NASA, Space Shuttle
PrcessingStatus Report: S05-007 (Feb 18, 2005), available online at <http://www.nasa.gov/home/
hqnews/2005/feb/HQ-s05007 shuttlestatus.html> (visited Mar 26, 2005).
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the accident: continuing construction of the ISS18 and the Shuttle servicing
mission to the Hubble Space Telescope. After Columbia's crash but before the
CAIB Report was issued, NASA had planned on having the shuttle resume
carriage of varying modules to the ISS (which was orbiting around the Earth
about 240 miles away) to expand the living and working space on board and to
replenish water, food, and equipment supplies. NASA had also planned the
Hubble Servicing Mission, SM-4. 9
Before the Columbia accident, the Hubble Space Telescope was scheduled
to be serviced in 2004-2005, as it was anticipated that the telescope may become
inoperable by 2006-2007. By the fall of 2003, a Hubble servicing mission would
need to be mounted by mid-2007 to keep the telescope operational.
The CAIB recommendation directly applicable to this mission was 6.4-1,
which provided, in part: "For non-Station missions, develop a comprehensive
autonomous (independent of [International Space] Station) inspection and repair
capability to cover the widest possible range of damage scenarios.' 2 °
As for inspection techniques, NASA did not view the solution as simply
sending an astronaut out to do a space walk and "look around" for obvious
holes. Spacewalks carry significant risks. For instance, a spacewalk can cause the
astronaut or her equipment to damage the exterior of the ship, particularly where
the astronaut is in close contact with the ship's surface while performing an
inspection. Furthermore, the astronaut might not detect hairline or microscopic
cracks that could destroy the vehicle. To alleviate such risks and to satisfy
CAIB's recommendations of February 2004, NASA was developing a boom
structure to which a special camera would be attached. This structure would
extend from the shuttle while in space and the boom would meticulously and
methodically pass the "eye" of the camera over the entire edge of the shuttle's
wings and other important parts. The device would perform a minutely detailed
examination by looking for obvious holes on one end of the spectrum and tiny
cracks, which may portend catastrophic failure, on the other. However, as of the
winter of 2003, the ability to complete the development of the boom structure in
time for the Hubble Servicing Mission is questionable. Moreover, the boom was
designed primarily to review the wing edges. The crew aboard the ISS would use

18

The construction of the International Space Station was about half complete when the Columbia

19

tragedy occurred. The large modules, which comprise the science, living, and working quarters,
can only be transported to space aboard the space shuttle.
While Hubble Space Telescope also orbits the Earth, it is in a different orbit than the

20

International Space Station and at such a distance from it that the space shuttle cannot get from
one to the other.
CAIB, Report at 174, Recommendation 6.4-1 (cited in note 8).
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telescopic lens of digital cameras to view the tiles on the underside of the shuttle.
No such technique had been determined for the Hubble servicing mission.
NASA had also been working on repair materials and techniques to use if
impact damage was detected in orbit. This was a particularly difficult challenge.
As of the winter of 2003, numerous compounds and materials were being
studied for use with the Shuttle, but very little progress was being made on
openings of any significant size. Additionally, numerous techniques for applying
the compounds or attached materials were being examined. Then, as now, the
techniques are only barely capable of dealing with a narrow range of
circumstances. Many of the techniques also require the use of the ISS. Many
efforts are being undertaken to address this, but the question for the agency was
whether these efforts would make a mission to the Hubble Space Telescope
adequately safe in absence of the corresponding space station.
And so the challenge to NASA was the following: would NASA be able to
fulfill the recommendation of the CAIB and prepare two vehicles (one to fly the
servicing mission and one to fly the rescue mission, if it were required) in time to
repair the Hubble before it became inoperable? As fall became winter, it became
clearer to the Administrator, for reasons discussed later, that it was unlikely the
recommendation could be met.
There was yet another matter of concern-that of a safe haven. If a shuttle
was damaged during launch or in orbit and became stranded in space, would
there be time to launch a rescue mission? In its investigation, the CAIB had
called upon NASA to study whether or not a theoretical rescue mission could
have been timely mounted had NASA been more diligent and had assessed early
the damaged condition of the shuffle. It concluded in Finding 6.4-2 that "Jilf
Program managers were able to unequivocally determine before Flight Day
Seven that there was potentially catastrophic damage to the left wing, accelerated
processing of Atlantis might have provided a window in which Atlantis could
rendezvous with Columbia before Columbia's limited consumables ran out."'"
Even though it found that the window of opportunity for a rescue mission
was possible but very limited, the CAIB did not go so far as to require a safe
haven-a place where crew members of a crippled shuttle could reside while
awaiting a rescue mission by another shuttle. However, NASA recognized that
the ISS afforded that opportunity for a safe haven (or could be made to do so)
so that a more reasonable opportunity at mounting a rescue mission could be
managed. A Hubble servicing mission offered no opportunity for a safe haven,
except that to a more limited degree, the shuttle itself offered a narrow margin
of safety that would allow a rescue mission, if mounted quickly (as was

21

Id, Finding 6.4-2.
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demonstrated by the study requested by the CAIB in connection with the
Columbia accident). But the amount of time a crippled shuttle could provide a
safe environment for its crew waiting for a rescue mission by another shuttle
was likely to be less than the time required to mount a rescue mission.
Thus, in the winter of 2003, these capabilities to satisfy the
recommendations, though assiduously studied, simply did not exist. The
Administrator, amidst all of the circumstances outlined above, determined that it
was not likely that NASA could adequately comply with CAIB's
recommendations to have in place inspection and repair capabilities that would
be able to address a wide spectrum of possible damage to the shuttle in the
available window of repair time for the Hubble Space Telescope.
At that time, the return to flight was proceeding very slowly. There were no
proven engineering solutions that would prevent significant foam and debris
shedding like the kind that caused Columbia's demise, nor was there any
assurance that the recommended comprehensive autonomous inspection and
repair capability to repair debris shedding could work.
NASA Administrator O'Keefe also knew that Hubble was nearing the end
of its original fifteen year mission 22 and that another new observatory was
already in design: the James Webb Space Telescope. It was scheduled to be
launched in 2011. While it was not intended to serve as a substitute for the
Hubble, it did provide some overlapping coverage as well as observational
opportunities the Hubble was incapable of performing. O'Keefe was also
advised that the Hubble could probably be made to last longer than its projected
usefulness (until 2007-2008) by conserving battery usage through more effective
and efficient management of the observatory. This could bridge at least some of
the gap while waiting for the James Webb Space Telescope to come on line.
While O'Keefe viewed it as a close call, in December 2003, he decided to
cancel the SM-4 manned servicing mission to the Hubble Space Telescope. He
believed that NASA could not then prove 23 that it was safe for the astronaut
servicing crew to undertake the mission given that the required capabilities
would not likely be developed in time to adhere to the CAIB

22

23

Although subsequent to the setting of the original fifteen-year term, NASA did extend the term
by an additional five years predicated upon SM-4.
The kind of proof that the CAIB Board called for was well-reasoned engineering analysis. See
CAIB, Report at 172, Finding 6.3-23 (cited in note 8) (observing that NASA's managers focused
on the bottom line regarding the debris strike on Columbia with "little discussion of analysis,
assumptions, issues, or ramifications'). See also id at 172, Finding 6.3-22 ("Program managers
required engineers to prove that the debris strike created a safety-of-flight issue: that is, engineers
had to produce evidence that the system was unsafe rather than prove that it was safe.").
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recommendations. 24 NASA had previously ignored safety recommendations,
partially complied with them, or simply forgotten them in order to pursue
mission objectives. It would be tempting to pursue the continued operation of
the immensely successful Hubble Space Telescope. But, in the Administrator's
opinion, principled compliance with the spirit and letter of the CAIB
recommendations required cancellation.
He planned to announce his decision upon the issuance of the budget in
early February 2004. Having made repeated and firm assurances of acceptance
of CAIB's findings and compliance with their recommendations, the
Administrator was not about to shrink from those assurances in the face of what
was expected to be strong criticism.
At the same time, during the fall and early winter of 2003, the White House
had convened a working group to develop the vision for civil space that the
CAIB said was lacking and which it deemed to be one of the contributing causes
in the demise of the Columbia. It was in this working group that the wisdom of
continuing to fly the shuttle for any purpose was vigorously debated. In the end,
on January 14, 2004, less than a year after the tragedy, the President announced
his decision to return the shuttle to flight-but only to finish construction of the
ISS (projected completion in about 2010).25 The ISS would be used solely as a
research platform to study the long-term effects of space on humans in order to
support the overarching goal of having humans return to the moon, and extend
a human presence eventually to Mars and beyond. Contemporaneously, NASA
should develop a new spaceship, which would be capable of traveling to the
moon, Mars, and beyond to explore the universe and search for life. No
reference was made to the Hubble Space Telescope.

24

25

On June 1, 2004, Sean O'Keefe spoke to the American Astronomical Society and explained the
rationale for his decision to terminate SM-4: "The Columbia Accident Investigation Board
recommended that we change our culture to a commitment to 'prove that it is safe' rather than
place the burden of proof on folks to 'prove that it's not safe.' Well, with that guidance in mind,
we're nowhere near close to proving that it's safe. It's not the unknowns we are wrestling with, it's
the knowns that we haven't yet devised a way yet to conquer." Sean O'Keefe, Administrator,
NASA, Speech to the American Astronomical Society, Annual Meeting (June 1, 2004), available
online at <http://www.nasa.gov/audience/formedia/speeches/ok-astronomical_060104.html>
(visited Mar 26, 2005).
This was a tidy solution to the admonition of the CAIB that NASA address the inescapable
conclusion that the Shuttle be replaced and to the recertification requirement imposed by the
CAIB to make it likely that NASA would do so. The CAIB declared that because of the shuttle's
age, flights taking place after 2010 would be predicated on recertification at the material,
component, subsystem, and system levels. CAIB, Report at 209, Recommendation 9.2-1 (cited in
note 8). Such a recertification could be quite expensive and may not significantly reduce the risk
involved. Retirement would avoid the cost and redirect money to a new vehicle--one
theoretically safer than the shuttle.
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In the days following the President's announcement, speculation ripened
that NASA would not fly to service the Hubble. Although the Administrator
had hoped to prepare the NASA science community and the public for the
rationale behind his decision in a planned news release, the media pressed him
for an answer, and he was forced to prematurely publicly acknowledge his
decision.
Once O'Keefe's decision became known, it was highly criticized by the
space science community of astronomers and, astrophysicists as dead wrong.26 A
public outcry erupted from the science community, with a heavy dose of vitriol
included-careers had been made on the strength of the science associated with
the Hubble and careers would certainly change, if not end, with its demise. The
scientists and politicians whose constituents would be negatively impacted by the
Administrator's decision undertook a vigorous campaign to reverse the decision.
the lives of astronauts, was accused of
NASA, in its attempt to protectS ,27
"committing a crime against science." In the past, NASA had been justifiably
criticized for not taking external advice regarding safety seriously. Now its
Administrator was scrupulously complying with safety advice and was being
criticized for taking it too seriously.
The National Geographic carried an article tided Fighting to Save Hubble
Telescope From Fiery Death.28 The hysteria was so intense that one reporter recently
said that at the time of the NASA Administrator's decision to cancel SM-4 in
January of 2004, it was as if he "had proposed killing the world's last panda
bear. ' 29 The outcry caught on and politicians 30 and the public alike, all of whom

26

Ironically, the science community (members of which have often derided the spaceflight
community as "Shuttle huggers") were now insisting on the shuttle being used to "save" the
robotic Hubble.
Erik Baard, Scientists Clamor to Save Hubble, WiredNews.com (Jan 31, 2004), available online at
(visited Feb 16, 2005)
<http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,62103,00.htrml>
(quoting Robert Zubrin, President, Mars Society).
Stefan Lovgren, Fightingto Save Hubble Telescope From Fiey Death, National Geographic News (Dec

29

online at
<http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/12/
available
30, 2003),
1230_031230_hubbletelescope.html> (visited Feb 13, 2005).
David Kestenbaum, National Public Radio, Morning Edition (Dec 9, 2004), voice recording

26

27

30

42
10313> (visited
available online at <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=
Mar 26, 2005).
Senator Barbara A. Mikulski (D-MD), in whose home state the Hubble Institute is located, sent a
letter to NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe on January 21, 2004, expressing shock and surprise
at the decision to cancel SM-4. Letter from Barbara A. Mikuiski to Sean O'Keefe, Administrator,
NASA (Jan 21, 2004), available online at <http://mikulski.senate.gov/Newsroom/
Hubbleonesmall.pdf> (visited Mar 26, 2005). In her letter, Senator Mikulski stated that, while she
recognized that astronaut safety was important, the Hubble mission was also very important. She
requested a study commission to evaluate O'Keefe's decision. Id. In addition, on March 3,'2004,
Congressman Mark Udall (D-CO) introduced H Res 550, 108th Cong, 2d Sess (Mar 3, 2004), in
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had become addicted to the remarkable and unique images produced over the
telescope's storied history over the preceding thirteen years, clamored to reverse
the NASA Administrator's decision.
This was not the first time that NASA encountered profound resentment
and derision from the scientific community to a decision to terminate a space
telescope for safety reasons. On March 25, 2000, Dr. Ed Weiler, Associate
Administrator for the Office of Space Science at NASA's headquarters, made
the decision to deorbit the Compton Gamma Ray Observatory, a sister
observatory 3' to the Hubble Space Telescope for safety reasons. Then, as now,
scientists pronounced that "[t]he scientific case for continuation of the mission
is beyond question," as they contemplated that their research work would be
interrupted for a few years while waiting for a replacement telescope to come on
line.32 But then, as now, Compton Gamma Ray Observatory served its full
planned life expectancy and safety concerns (to provide a controlled deorbit to
Earth to avoid having debris fall on inhabited lands) were deemed more
important than the continued scientific knowledge to be gained by its continued
flight.
In an effort to find an alternative means to repair Hubble, thereby allowing
it to continue collection scientific data, NASA evaluated the possibility of
servicing the Hubble by employing a "robotic" spacecraft that could be remotely
operated from Earth and could perform basic tasks to keep the Hubble
operational. NASA announced an effort to assess the prospects, scope, cost, and

31

32

150 Cong Rec E 292 (Mar 3, 2004), urging that an independent panel review O'Keefe's decision
not to extend the life of the Hubble Space Telescope. Representatives Todd Akin (R-MO),
Roscoe Bartlett (R-MD), Bart Gordon (D-TN), Steny Hoyer (D-MD), Nick Lampson (D-TX),
Jim McDermott (D-WA), and C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger (D-MD) joined Representative Udall as
the original co-sponsors.
Compton Gamma Ray Observatory and Hubble Space Telescope are two of four telescopes
(Chandra X-Ray and Spitzer Infrared Telescopes being the other two) which comprise NASA's
Great Observatories for Space Astrophysics. These observatories had been planned as a family of
four orbiting satellites carrying telescopes designed to study the universe in both visible light and
non-visible forms of radiation. See NASA, The Last of the Great Observatories, available online at
<http://www.nasa.gov/missions/deepspace/MICM-Feature_01.html> (visited Mar 27, 2005).
The first in the series was the Hubble Space Telescope, launched in 1990. See HubbleSite.org,
Frequently Asked Questions, What is the Hubble Space Telescope?, available online at
<http://hubblesite.org/reference-desk/faq/answer.php.id=76&cat=hst> (visited Mar 27, 2005).
Compton was launched aboard the Space Shuttle Atlantis in April 1991, and, at seventeen tons,
was the largest astrophysical payload ever flown at that time. See SpaceToday.org, Coaton Gamma
at
available
online
Vioknt
Universe,
Rays
in
a
Observatory:
Gamma
Ray
<http://www.spacetoday.org/DeepSpace/Telescopes/GreatObserv tories/Compton/Compton.
html> (visited Mar 27, 2005).
Leonard David, Scientists Ty to Save Gamma Raj Observatory (May 15, 2000), available online at
<http://www.space.com/scienceastronomy/astronomy/save-compton_000515.htn-d>
Feb 13, 2005).
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timing for such a mission. But the pressure for a manned shuttle servicing
mission persisted.
III. THE DEMAND FOR AN INDEPENDENT STUDY
Shortly after the Administrator's decision, Barbara Mikulski, Senator from
Maryland, issued a press release on January 29, 2004. Analogizing Hubble to a
patient receiving a medical diagnosis, she advised that she had procured an33
agreement from the NASA Administrator to seek "a second opinion."
Apparently, the Administrator had given an initial diagnosis that the "patient"
did not want to hear. "We cannot prematurely terminate the last servicing
mission without a rigorous review," she said. In response, NASA agreed to
requests. for an outside study and requested a National Academy of Sciences
review of the options to "save" the Hubble and for their considered
recommendation to NASA.
IV. THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CAIB WEIGHS IN AND DISTILLS
THE CRITICAL ISSUES
The NASA Administrator requested that Admiral Harold W. "Hal"
Gehman Jr., the Chairman of the CAIB, provide Senator Mikulski with his views
"... regarding safety and risk factors identified in the report of the Columbia
Accident Investigation Board" from his perspective as Chairman of the Board.34
Admiral Gehman highlighted the importance of the issue by expressing support
for national debate. He stated: "Whether to fly another mission to the Hubble is
one of the public policy debates this nation should have, thus I am pleased to
add whatever clarity I can to the terms of the debate."35
He quoted from the CAIB Report and offered the touchstone for any
discussion relative to the shuttle: that flying the shuttle was risky and far from
routine.
Because of the dangers of ascent and re-entry, because of the hostility of the
space environment, and because we are still relative newcomers to this
realm, operation of the Shuttle and indeed all human spaceflight must be
viewed as a developmental undertaking. Throughout the Columbia accident
investigation, the Board has commented on the widespread but erroneous
33

Barbara A. Mikulski, Press Release, O'Keefe Agrees to Mikulsk's Requestfor Independent Review Before
29,
2004),
available
(Jan
Canceling Final Hubble Servidng Mission
<http://mikulski.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=217968> (visited Feb 16, 2005).

online

at

34

Letter from Harold W. Gehman, Jr. to Barbara A. Mikulski, US Senator, at 1 (Mar 5, 2004),
available online at <http://mikulski.senate.gov/Newsroom/GehmanReviewsmall.lfdf> (visited
Feb 13, 2005).

35

Id.
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perception of the Space Shuttle as somehow comparable to civil or military
air transport. They are not comparable; the inherent risks of spaceflight are
vastly higher, and our experience level with spaceflight is vastly lower. If
Shuttle operations came to be viewed as routine, it was, at least in part,
thanks to the skill and dedication of those involved in the program. They
have made it look easy, though in fact it never was. The Board urges NASA
leadership, the architects of U.S. space policy, and the American people to
adopt a realistic understanding of the risks and rewards of venturing into
36
space.
The risk of catastrophic loss of the ship due to continued operation of the
shuttle in the future was quite significant, according to Admiral Gehman. In this
regard, the Board Chairman concluded that the thrust of the CAIB Report
"[was] to launch thefewestpossible number of Shuttle missions. Indeed, the bottom line of the
Future'partof our Report is to replace the Shuttle as soon aspossible. ...
When it came to the more difficult issue, the Chairman punted on making
any conclusions about the propriety of a manned servicing mission to the
Hubble Space Telescope, but he opined that the bottom line was that "[s]huttle
flights are dangerous and we should fly the minimum number necessary.' 38 He
then concluded that:
While we studied and deliberated these Return to Flight recommendations,
it became apparent to us that missions to the ISS had a significant advantage in
a
implementing our recommendations over those that were not going to the ISS [i.e.
servicing mission to Hubble]. Consequently we decided to differentiate RTF
[return-to-flight] recommendations between missions to the ISS and nonISS missions. Our report refers only to ISS missions or non-ISS missions.
We did not specify what non-ISS missions might be flown (Columbia's final
mission was, of course, a non-ISS mission). In our [the CAIB's] view,
missions to the ISS allowed a more complete and robust inspection and repaircapabilioy
39
to be developed".
Admiral Gehman went on to say that Recommendation 4.6-1 governing
non-ISS missions and providing for repairs of the widest range possible could

36

Id at 2 (quoting CAIB, Report at 207 (cited in note 8)).

37

Letter from Harold W. Gehman, Jr. to Barbara A. Mikulski at 2 (emphasis added) (cited in note
34).
Id at 3. We have flown 111 out of 113 Space Shuttle missions without catastrophic failure, for a

38

98.23 percent reliability rate. Thus, the chance that we will be able to fly 25 future missions using
this reliability figure without a loss is 64 percent. The more missions we fly, the more that 64
percent number goes down. In this author's opinion, implementing all the Return to Flight
recommendations made by the CAIB raises the reliability number somewhat-to what, exactly,
no one is sure. A reliability number more like 99 percent seems reasonable, giving a 78 percent
chance we will fly the 25 missions without loss. Once again, more missions cause that 78 percent
number to go down. Flying one more mission, 26 in all, reduces the probability of series success
by about one percentage point.

39 Id at 4 (emphasis added).
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translate into other words, to wit: "Do the best you can."' This is a fairly
remarkable statement, and one might wonder why the CAIB did not simply use
those words in the actual report.
He then made another rather remarkable statement. He confessed to the
following: "We knew we were essentially REDUCING the requirements [to
maintain the same margin of risk as the ISS]. Reducing the rigor of our
requirements INCREASES the risk. It cannot be seen any other way.",4' Admiral
Gehman thereby waved the proverbial red flag to Senator Mikulski, and later to
the National Academy of Sciences Commission, that the CAB saw a greater risk
of not being able to bring a Shuttle home safely when conducting a non-ISS
mission. Gehman did go on to say that the increased risk was "probably not
capabilities involved, the risk
knowable in advance, and knowing the technical
' 42
difference is probably small, but it is not zero.
One can only wonder why the CAIB permitted NASA to reduce the
requirements to maintain the same margin of risk as the ISS, leading to increased
risk and danger to astronauts and to one of three remaining shuttles. This
permission implies that the CAIB must have actually considered the possibility
of a shuttle flight to the Hubble and realized that it was less safe than a shuttle
flight to the ISS, but did not want to foreclose that possibility entirely by placing
too rigorous of a requirement on NASA at the outset. Thus, the CAIB would
leave room for "deep and rich"4 3 discussion for another day. Admiral Gehman
stopped short of condemning a shuttle flight to the Hubble Space Telescope and
clearly focused the nature of the debate for NASA and for the NASC, stating,
"[b]ottom line: Complying fully with the CAIB's RTF recommendations is less a
challenge when factoring in the ISS. The CAIB allowed more latitude in
complying with our recommendations for non-ISS missions, which may be
slightly more risky, taking into account only the debris shedding threat to the
Orbiter. "'
In the end, Admiral Gehman suggested that "... only a deep and rich
study of the entire 41 gain/risk equation can answer the question of whether an
is worth the risks
extension of the life of the wonderful Hubble telescope
46
involved, and that is beyond the scope of this letter.,
40

Id.

41

Id (emphasis in original).

42

Id.

43

Id at 5.

44

Id.

45

The risk to the ship and the astronauts goes beyond the risk of debris shedding. Shedding was the
only factor considered for the non-ISS recommendation by the CAIB.
Letter from Harold W. Gehman, Jr. to Barbara A. Mikulski at 5 (cited in note 34).

46
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V. THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
COMMITTEE REPORT
The National Academy of Sciences created its commission, the NASC, and
populated it with many distinguished members from relevant and varied walks
of life, each of whom brought significant experience, expertise, and intellectual
capacity to bear on the problem (including a former NASA Administrator, two
Nobel Laureates, an expert in robotics, a former astronaut, and a former
member of the CAIB, to name a few). The Committee retained an outside
consultant, Aerospace Corporation, to provide technical advice relative to the
risk associated with the attempt to robotically repair the Hubble. The report that
NASC issued essentially attempts to demonstrate that there are "enormous
benefits to science
universe," and that

.

.
"...

. ,

including enhanced understanding of the physical
the safety risk for a single mission to the ISS
' 47 is

comparable to the safety risk for a mission to the Hubble Space Telescope.

8
Indeed, the NASC
This Paper will not endeavor to refute the first point."

makes a very compelling argument of scientific value of the research performed
based on 1) pictures taken by the Hubble Space Telescope, 2) the long line of
scientists who wait to use it, and 3) the very substantial competition there is to
use it. Perhaps the most compelling evidence of its value is that the American
people are enamored by it. You don not need an NASC report to demonstrate
that. However, it is important to point out that there are two other telescopes in
space that are part of the Great Observatory program, each intending to capture
different segments of the light spectrum. The most recent of them is the Spitzer
Infrared Telescope launched in August of 2003, which is producing incredible
images and leading to remarkable discoveries of it own. The other observatory is
Chandra, an x-ray telescope. Another significant telescope, the James Webb
telescope, is currently under development.
The ultimate finding of the NASC that the risk of danger to astronauts
going to the ISS is relatively on par with the risk of astronauts going for a
servicing mission to the Hubble Space Telescope seemed, from this author's
point of view, to be strained to find ways to undercut the favorable attributes of
the ISS, on the one hand, and strained to minimize the unfavorable attributes of
the servicing mission to the Hubble Space Telescope, on the other. The heart of
the analysis is contained in Chapter 6 of its report, which covers seventeen
pages.

47
48

NASC, Assessment of Optionsfor Extending the ife of the Hubble Space Telescope at 86, 105 (cited in note
1).
However, are the benefits to science worth risking the lives of seven people?
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At the outset of its analysis of the Shuttle Servicing Alternative, the NASC
identified the "requirements":
A. CAIB requirement 6.4-1 calling for inspection and repair of the Thermal
Protection System;
B. CAIB Requirement 4.2-4 "requir[ing] the Space Shuttle to be operated
with the same degree of safety for micrometeoroid and orbital debris as the
degree of safety calculated for the International Space Station."
C. NASA's Return to Flight Space Shuttle.Program Action SSP-3 calling for
a safe haven on board the ISS providing contingency life support on board
the International Space Station to stranded Shuttle crewmembers until
repair or rescue can be affected.49
A. INSPECTION AND REPAIRS OF THE THERMAL
PROTECTION SYSTEM
NASA advised the NASC that it intended to comply with all of the
relevant recommendations of the CAIB. Particularly, with regard to flights to the
International Space Station, it advised the NASC that
[o]n ISS missions, inspections will also be accomplished by the ISS crew
during orbiter approach. Following docking, inspections will be by ISS
equipment and/or extravehicular activity (EVA). TPS repair techniques are
being developed to permit repair to both tile and reinforced carbon-carbon
(RCC) components. Initially, TPS repairs are planned while the orbiter is
attached to the ISS using the SRMS to position the orbiter relative to the
ISS to provide an astronaut repair work station. After the ISS Node 2 is
deployed (currently scheduled on the eighth flight following return to
flight), the SRMS5 will no longer be able to reach the
5 1 ISS grapple fixture
and so different procedures will have to be developed.

Thus, in order to achieve the requirements of the CAIB recommendations,
NASA intended to use the ISS to perform inspections and repairs. That
intention will be achievable for the first eight missions. After the eighth mission,
different, but as yet undetermined, procedures were to be developed. NASA
believed that the above noted methodology was advantageous because it could
be performed adequately and in a reasonable time to allow the mission work to
be performed.
NASA indicated that a different procedure could be used on a Hubble
servicing mission, but it would take more time, thus impacting the ability to
perform the mission. The NASC was dismissive of that concern and suggested
49

50
51

NASC, Assessment of Optionsfor Extending the Life of the Hubble Space Telescope at 75-76 (cited in note

1).
SRMS stands for "Shuttle Remote Manipulator System" (in plain English, a robotic arm).
NASC, Assessment of Optionsfor Extending the life of the Hubble Space Telescope at 76-77 (cited in note
1).
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that "[t]he committee believe[d] that it [was] possible to develop additional
sensors that would reduce the time required to perform an inspection on a
to scaled
The options range[d] from new techniques
shuttle HST mission.
•
,,
52
The NASC
versions of the current sensors to fill the SRMS coverage gap.
therefore concluded as a finding that "[a] complete inspection of the orbiter
on a shuttle servicing mission to
thermal protection system can be accomplished
53
SRMS/OBSS."
the
and
SRMS
HST using the
Without contesting that something "can be accomplished," the finding
begs the question: in what time and with what resources? It is implicit in the
NASC findings that this is a de minimis issue. But is it? Will the development of
this CAIB-required capability possibly be done on time to make a servicing
mission to the Hubble? Will it be able get this done without adding to the risk of
preparing for the mission? It seems that the NASC presumes so, but NASA
does not have the luxury of such a presumption. As stated earlier, NASA was
heavily criticized by the CAIB for failing to prove that the system was safe.
Likewise, per the CAIB recommendations, NASA must prove the alternatives
offered by the NASC are also safe before it can comfortably argue that the
CAIB recommendations can be met. Saying it to be so does not necessarily
make it safe.
The NASC describes NASA's plan relative to the repairs of the Thermal
Protection System:
[Thermal Protection System] repairs are planned while the orbiter is
attached to the ISS using the SRMS ... to position the orbiter relative to the
ISS to provide an astronaut repair work station. After the ISS Node 254 is
deployed (currently scheduled on the eighth flight following return to
flight), the SRMS will no longer be able to reach the
55 ISS grapple fixture and
so different procedures will have to be developed.
Again, the NASC demonstrated a very positive attitude towards the
Hubble servicing mission option and offered that NASA -position the crew at
the work site where NASA is currently developing a technique using the SRMS/
OBSS. While NASA can be expected to succeed in developing this new
technique (because it usually is), the NASC offers no information to
demonstrate the likelihood that NASA would be able to do so, the timing of the
completion of its development, its limitations, or what the risk associated with

52

Id at 78.

53

Id. OBSS stands for "Orbiter Boom Sensor System" (an extension of the robotic arm which
contains special sensors to detect cracks or holes).

54

A node for purposes of the International Space Station is a module that serves as an attachment
point for other living, equipment, or sciences modules in the x, y, and z axes.

55

NASC, Assessment of Optionsfor Extending the LDfe of the Hubble Space Telescope at 77 (cited in note 1).
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such a technique might be.56 There is an assumption of success without proof
that it will be so and that it will occur in time for servicing the Hubble Space
Telescope.
B. NASA's SAFE HAVEN REQUIREMENT
NASA recognized that if the shuttle travels to the ISS, appropriate
preparations must be made to provide for the Station's use as a safe haven in the
event of an irreparable problem with the shuttle that would prevent its return to
Earth. NASA analysis indicates that the astronauts could be housed in the ISS
for thirty to ninety days beyond the shuttle mission timeframe. This is an
important contingency plan which shows that NASA is thinking more
thoroughly about worst case scenarios. Although NASA has endeavored to
reduce the possibility of debris shedding on lift off, there is still the possibility of
damage from that or other sources. 5The
safe haven contingency plan also
accounts for other circumstances that might occur with the shuttle, such as
some form of malfunction of the ship itself.
The NASC concluded that ISS's safe haven would offer operational
flexibility and time to adapt to real time problems in case of a critical ascent
impact event that is both detected and repairable, or that affords the option of a
shuttle rescue mission. Specifically, the NASC cautiously observed that:
[t]he additional time provided by the ISS safe haven capability, assuming it
is available, provides the following attributes:
* Additional time to repair the damaged Shuttle and prepare the
Shuttle for re-entry.
* Additional time to make modifications to the rescue vehicle and its
cargo if required and to launch the rescue shuttle.
* Schedule relief for the shuttle launch team. 58
However, the NASC pessimistically concluded that NASA's plan for a safe
haven has significant risks, which undercut its value because of the possibility of
56

The presumptiveness is sloppy on the part of the NASC. In an effort to rebut the likelihood that

NASA would be able to develop a robotic servicing module, the NASC engaged Aerospace
Corp ("Aerospace") to critique the NASA effort. Aerospace concluded that NASA's effort
was too risky to be successful. Id at 103-04. One wonders whether Aerospace should have
assessed the repair techniques being developed by NASA, as these techniques, much like the
robotic servicing of a Hubble Space Telescope, have never been tried before in space. If the
repairs were to fail, loss of a spaceship and its crew would be likely.
57

ss

Damage could occur in several ways, including upon liftoff (in spite of efforts to reduce debris
shedding), due to micro-meteoroid impact, due to space walk inspections (which may be
necessary), or even due to space walks to repair the Thermal Protection Shield.
NASC, Assessment of Optionsfor Extending the Life of the Hubble Space Telescope at 79 (cited in note 1).
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the failure of life support and the difficulty of putting additional supplies aboard
the ISS. First, the NASC argued that the ISS life support system is zero fault
tolerant, which means that any failure would render the entire system
inoperative. Second, it presumed that necessary supplies could not be adequately
pre-positioned aboard the ISS to accommodate ten people: the seven crew
members of the shuttle and the three members of the ISS. There is, however,
no assessment of whether these are significant issues (there has been a historical
pattern of difficulty), or whether they are ones which cannot be mitigated.
The NASC then discussed the possibility of a safe haven aboard the shuttle
itself while on a mission to the Hubble Space Telescope. It concluded that a safe
haven could be afforded for a period of seventeen to thirty days. In contrast,
NASA believes that the safe haven afforded by the ISS is between thirty and
ninety days. There is no real assessment of the comparative differential created
by these suggested safe haven environments.
The NASC then attempted to demonstrate that a safe haven of seventeen
to thirty days was sufficient time for a rescue shuttle to launch. After a brief
discussion of the matter, the NASC concluded that "[limited time would be
available to execute a rescue. ' 6 ° To achieve this "limited" time, another shuttle
would have to be ready for launch on the second launch pad.6 '
But again, there is a dearth of analysis to determine just how realistic the
rapid response rescue for a stranded shuttle servicing the Hubble would be. In
fact, there are numerous possibilities for risk of a delay of a rescue launch, which
were not discussed in the report or apparently considered by the NASC. And if a
launch is delayed for even a short period of time, with the "limited" time
available for a rescue, the result may be that the lack of an ISS-type safe haven
alternative to the shuttle would result in the demise of the crew.
Indeed, delays of a shuttle launch are, in fact, the rule, not the exception.
Delays can be caused by technical issues that may be preventable or correctible.
On the other hand, delays can be caused by uncontrollable factors, such as
weather. With such a short time to conduct a rescue mission for a Hubble
Shuttle mission, it is also surprising that the NASC did not cite a factual premise
for its conclusion that a rescue mission could be launched without any
significant delay either due to technical issues or weather limitations. Indeed, one
launch in 2002 was delayed for nearly two weeks due to various reasons,
including bad weather at an abort landing site in Spain, even though the weather
at the launch site at the same time was perfect.

60

Presumably, the NASC anticipates that NASA will return the International Space Station crew to
its original complement of three, but at this time the crew consists of two astronauts.
NASC, Assessment of OptionsforExtendng the Ife of the Hubble Space Telescope at 81 (cited in note 1).

61

Id.

59
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Furthermore, it is disappointing that the NASC did not discuss or consider
the possibility that a rescue would be intentionally "rushed ' 62 and that certain
launch requirements would be abandoned because it might be the only way to
save the stranded crew due to the limited time within which the crew could
survive on a stranded shuttle servicing the Hubble. The NASC failed to explore
the consequences of such an action.
Consider, for example, if we would have known that Columbia, while in
orbit, was damaged and was in danger of destruction on return to the Earth's
atmosphere. Assume we chose to send another shuttle to rescue the crew and
risk the same damage to the rescue vehicle as befell the Columbia (which is an
extraordinarily difficult decision itself).63 What is the likelihood that the window
for launch (which is often only minutes in a given day) would be affected by the
weather at the launch site or the abort landing site, thus grounding the mission
for several days? If safe haven is limited to days, even a technically able shuttle
may not get up in time. What if the weather concerns are exacerbated by
technical problems? Is the limited survival time aboard a shuttle on a Hubble
SM-4 mission simply too brief when facing circumstances that constantly plague
shuttle launches?
Moreover, because of the short time for rescue in the scenario where there
is no ISS safe haven, there is the nagging possibility that such a rescue mission
might be launched before the cause of the stranded shuttle's damage can be
understood. Further, there is also the possibility that in order to mount a quick
rescue mission, the decisionmaker would choose not to mitigate against a repeat
failure in the rescue mission. On the other hand, the decisionmaker may wish to
mitigate against a repeat failure and take longer than necessary to rescue the
stranded shuttle crew. This was simply not addressed by the NASC.
In fact, the threat of a repeat failure is not the handwringing of a riskaverse mentality. It is a very real possibility. Consider that on October 2, 2002,
two flights prior to Columbia, on Atlantis flying as STS 112, a piece of foam
detached on launch from the left bipod ramp on the external tank and struck the
solid rocket aft skirt-fortunately resulting in no life or mission threatening
events. Later, on January 16, 2003, the foam detached on launch from the very
same place on the external tank, but this time struck the leading edge of the left
wing of Columbia, causing the catastrophe on re-entry. If a failure stranded a
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If you were the Administrator of NASA and were faced with the prospect of either abandoning
certain launch requirements in order to have a chance to launch immediately to rescue the
stranded crew or alternatively to delay the launch until the requirements were met, thereby
running a substantial risk that the astronauts were likely to perish, what would you do?
Does the decisionmaker know the reason for the damage? Does the decisionmaker know that it
won't occur again? Can the decisionmaker mitigate the risk of damage to the rescue vehicle?
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shuttle in space, an Administrator (or other decisionmaker) would be in an
excruciatingly difficult situation if forced to quickly decide whether to order a
rescue flight without knowing the cause for the failure in the first place because,
as in the case of STS 112 and STS 107, a repeat event can occur in short order
with catastrophic consequences.
There is a dramatic difference between a safe haven for a minimum of
seventeen days (shuttle safe haven near Hubble) versus a minimum of thirty days
(shuttle safe haven aboard ISS), and the contrasting benefits thereof should have
been analyzed and the consequences studied. Further, even though there is a risk
of loss of life support aboard the ISS, if a safe haven beyond the shuttle's
capability is required, one would be more likely to want to be at the ISS where a
life support system exists but may break down (as the NASC was concerned
about) than at the Hubble where there is no life support system at all. In the
end, even the NASC recognized the fact that having a safe haven external to the
shuttle (were it to go to the Hubble) is a good thing.64
C. A FLAWED CONCLUSION?
The NASC then undertook an assessment of the relative risks of a flight to
the ISS versus a flight to the Hubble Space Telescope. The NASC observed that
much of the risk of the shuttle flight is due to debris shedding on launch.
Because NASA has done so much good work to reduce the amount of debris,65
the NASC acknowledged "that post-RTF missions to the ISS will have some
safety advantage over an HST mission such as total time required to perform
ascent damage detection and the availability of crew safe haven and
, 66
rescue ....
But the NASC went on to negate the additional risks encountered by a
Hubblemission by asserting that ascent damage will be unlikely. It concluded
that "this post-RTF advantage will be small-because the need for such repairs
64

NASC, Assessment of Optionsfor Extending the Life of the Hubble Space Telescope at 80 (cited in note 1).
However, there was some recognition that having a safe haven alternative to the shuttle might
have been a good idea. In a footnote, the NASC offered that
"[i]n addition to the safe haven consideration discussed in this section, it came
to the committee's attention that commercial companies have suggested
options to launch a 'safe haven' vehicle into the HST orbit in order to provide
a longer-term capability. The committee understands that NASA has been
provided these proposals, which will naturally require a balancing of crew
safety, risk reduction, cost and schedule, and so on, if any are pursued."
Id at 80, n 7. Interestingly, the NASC did not undertake to assess the validity of these so-called
"options." Id.
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Apparently, no attempt was made to quantify this risk.
NASC, Assessment of Optionsfor Extending the Life of the Hubble Space Telescope at 85-86 (cited in note
1).
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and crew rescue will have been sharply reduced by elimination of critical ascent
debris."67 While there have been significant efforts and testing undertaken to
reduce the potential for ascent debris, and while these efforts have inspired a
corresponding confidence that ascent debris will acually be reduced, it is
positively remarkable that the NASC would accept that assertion as fact when
there have not yet been any flights to demonstrate whether the ascent debris
problem has been fixed.
D. SCHEDULE PRESSURE
The NASC does not even address another important set of CAIB
findings68 and recommendations6 9 particularly relevant to the NASC inquiry.
These had to do with perceived schedule pressure by NASA's management to
achieve a certain stage of completion (Node 2) of the ISS within a given period
of time.7" The CAIB determined that because of the perceived pressure to fly,
NASA personnel were less likely to be vigilant in the rigor of their analysis of
whether or not to fly and their efforts to be safety-conscious. 7 1 In Finding 6.2-6,
CAIB found that "[t]he environment to the countdown of Node 2 and the
importance of maintaining schedule may have begun to influence
managers'
' 73
decisions, including those made about the STS 11272 foam strike.
A very similar type of schedule pressure would be present in any effort to
repair the Hubble. Consider that there is an abiding concern by the NASC that
Hubble's batteries or gyroscopes may give out at any time leading to loss of the
telescope. While this may or may not happen in the near future, it is predicted to
occur in 2007. This is a genuine concern on the part of the NASC. In fact, this is
such a real concern for the NASC that it recommended that NASA service
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Id at 86. But such a limitation for assessing the risk of the Hubble mission is exactly what Admiral

Gehman warned against when he wrote to Senator Mikulski at the outset of the controversy over
whether to cancel the Hubble Telescope servicing mission. In that letter, he pointed out that "[i]t
is important to remember the CAIB is talking about risk to the Orbiter from debris shedding
events. There are many other factors involved that influence the total risk equation, sometimes
very significantly." Letter from Harold W. Gehman, Jr. to Barbara A. Mikulski at 4 (cited in note

34).
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CAIB, Report at 139, Findings 6.2-1 through 6.2-7 (cited in note 8).
Id, Recommendation 6.2-1.
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Hubble "as soon as possible" and as early as the seventh flight after returning to
74
flight.
The NASC is projecting that the shuttle servicing mission needs to fly
between July 2006 and July 2007."5 Thus, it will have to take place in the next
two years. Considering the delays in the attempts to return to flight already
experienced and the ordinary delays that have been experienced in the years
before Columbia, one wonders whether it is realistic to expect that the return to
flight effort will be able to provide the necessary servicing before the Hubble
becomes inoperable. This fear of scheduling pressure-increasing risk is precisely
one of the most significant factors that moved the Administrator to terminate
SM-4. Yet, there does not appear to be any assessment by the NASC of the risk
that the schedule may be compressed because of the fairly strict deadline on
servicing the Hubble.
The CAIB determined that there was a palpable perception that the
Columbia Shuttle mission was under pressure to meet the 1SS construction (Node
2) deadline-with known but unappreciated flaws in shuttle operations and
safety. It reprimanded NASA for creating this perception. Now the NASC
would knowingly recreate just such a schedule pressure--this time to meet an
uncertain Hubble operational status-with a shuttle system which should not be
considered routine and which will knowingly impose greater risk on the shuttle
and its crew. It is difficult to imagine that the NASC ignored the CAIB's report,
but it is also hard to conclude that the NASC forgot the guidance and
recommendations of the CAIB because the passage of time between its report
and that of the CAIB was only sixteen months. One is only left to wonder why
this schedule pressure issue was not addressed in the report. Perhaps the NASC
itself felt schedule pressure to deliver a report and glossed over truly
understanding and assessing the risks involved. Perhaps addressing the schedule
pressure issue would have led to a less dismissive conclusion about the risk of
flying a manned servicing mission or of a rescue mission.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Hubble Space Telescope is an important scientific instrument that, if
timely and adequately serviced, will continue to contribute to the knowledge and
benefit of mankind for some time to come. However, we must be cautious not
to become caught up with the wonder and success of the instrument and lose
74
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NASC, Assessment of Optionsfor Extending the Life of the Hubble Space Telescope at 83 (cited in note 1)
("To avoid putting the Hubble at risk and to maintain continuous science operation, the HST
servicing mission could be flown as early as the seventh flight after return to flight without a
critical operational impact on the ISS.").
Id at 55.
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sight of our capabilities. The lessons of Columbia have reminded us that the
pursuit of exploration and scientific discovery in the vastness of space can be
unforgiving, with catastrophic consequences to the crew and vehicle involved, as
well as to a civil space program. We must maintain vigilance and avoid doggedly
pursuing a scientific or engineering objective while losing sight of safety
concerns for humans aboard a space ship still deemed to be in a developmental
stage.
Having served as the Chief Legal Officer for NASA and having evaluated
whether to fly the Hubble servicing mission, I believe that the leadership of
NASA took the findings, recommendations, and report of the CAIB seriously
and endeavored to thoughtfully and completely consider all of the risks
involved. I believe that they arrived at a principled decision, and one that was
mindful of, but not overwhelmed by, the importance of the Hubble Space
Telescope and its science mission.
Certainly, reasonable people could disagree with NASA's conclusion.
However, reasonable people would want to evaluate all of the risks and benefits
from such a mission. In fully evaluating risks and benefits, there may still be
some who would choose to pursue this mission. However, what is clear from
the NASC report is that many risks considered by the CAIB and by NASA in its
decision to cancel the SM-4 Mission were either not addressed fully or not
addressed at all. Perhaps if the CAIB were called to address those matters, many
of which are referenced in this paper, it would have made a better assessment of
the relative risks of flying the mission and a reasonable person would be better
informed in making a decision.
Because the risks of a manned servicing mission to the Hubble Space
Telescope are not adequately addressed in the NASC report, it would be difficult
to responsibly rely on the report's conclusion that "... the safety risk for a single
mission to the International Space Station is comparable to the safety risk for a
mission to the Hubble Space Telescope." 76
VII. EPILOGUE
On February 8, 2005, the outgoing Administrator of NASA announced the
Bush Administration's plans regarding the Hubble Space Telescope in the
aftermath of the National Academies of Science report. In addition to staying
the course and declining to conduct a manned servicing mission, Administrator
O'Keefe announced, only days before his departure from NASA, that the NASA
effort to conduct a robotic servicing mission would be cancelled, citing the
National Academies of Science report as the principal reason:
76

NASC, Assessment of Optionsfor Extending the Life of the Hubble Space Telescope at 105 (cited in note 1).
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The academies "view it as highly unlikely given the expense of the task and
the effort necessary as well as their view [that] even if we could do it, we
probably could not [do it] in... time," O'Keefe told reporters. He said the

left "an incredibly difficult hill to climb to demonstrate the
position has
77
contrary."

As the calls for a manned servicing mission have recommenced7 1 (and even
calls for continuation of the robotic servicing mission'9), members of the
scientific community have begun to question whether the Hubble should even
be repaired. At a recent hearing before the House Science Committee chaired by
Congressman Sherwood Boehlert of New York, "an international team led by
Johns Hopkins University astronomers ... [offered that] the best answer may lie
not in a robot-led or manned repair mission, but through the launch of a brand
new, free-flying telescope called the 'Hubble Origins Probe.""'8
Should NASA decide that the analysis of costs and benefits of servicing an
aging telescope is more favorable than the same analysis for placing a new
telescope in the night sky and proceed to revisit the matter, a different
Administrator will make the call, one who perhaps will not have personally
experienced the tragedy accompanying the risks of flying the shuttle. For the
sake of America's civil space program one would hope that the next
Administrator and his or her leadership team come to deeply understand the
lessons of Columbia and its implications for all Other future shuttle missions,
including a Hubble SM-4 mission, should it be reconsidered.
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